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The trade structure effects of endogenous regional trade
agreements
Abstract
This paper formulates an empirical model to estimate the impact of endogenous new regional trade
agreement (RTA) membership on trade structure. The likelihood of new RTA membership is influenced
by economic fundamentals such as country size, factor endowments, and trade and investment costs. In
a sample of country-pairs covering mainly the OECD economies we find a particularly strong effect of
endogenous RTAs on intra-industry trade in a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching
techniques. The associated trade volume effects are similar to the ones found in previous research on the
effects of endogenous RTAs. Overall, this indicates that RTA membership might reduce inter-industry
trade not only in relative but also in absolute terms and that the trade volume effect is due to the
associated growth in trade within industries.
 1  
Revised for the Journal of International Economics, March 2007 
 
 
The Trade Structure Effects of 
Endogenous Regional Trade Agreements♣ 
 
Hartmut Egger 
University of Zurich 
Zurichbergstr. 14 
8032 Zurich 
Switzerland 
 Peter Egger 
University of Munich and Ifo 
Institute, 
Poschingerstr. 5 
81679 Munich 
Germany 
David Greenaway 
School of Economics 
 University of Nottingham 
University Park 
Nottingham NG7 2RD 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper formulates an empirical model to estimate the impact of endogenous new regional 
trade agreement (RTA) membership on trade structure. The likelihood of new RTA 
membership is influenced by economic fundamentals such as country size, factor 
endowments, and trade and investment costs. In a sample of country-pairs covering mainly 
the OECD economies we find a particularly strong effect of endogenous RTAs on intra-
industry trade in a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques. The 
associated trade volume effects are similar to the ones found in previous research on the 
effects of endogenous RTAs. Overall, this indicates that RTA membership might reduce inter-
industry trade not only in relative but also in absolute terms and that the trade volume effect is 
due to the associated growth in trade within industries. 
 
 
 
Key words: Regional trade agreements; Intra-industry trade; Endogenous treatment effects 
JEL classification: C21; F14; F15 
 
 
                                                 
♣ Acknowledgements: We are grateful to two anonymous referees and Co-editor Robert Staiger for extensive 
comments and helpful advice on earlier drafts. We also thank participants of a research seminar at the Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies for helpful discussion. Peter Egger acknowledges financial support 
from the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung through Grant J2280-G05. David 
Greenaway acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust under Programme Grant F114/BF. 
 2  
1 Introduction 
The voluminous literature on the consequences of regional trade agreements (RTAs) for 
welfare and trade is one of the central building blocks of research in international economics. 
While it is well understood theoretically under which conditions positive welfare effects of 
RTAs arise, empirical research has treated these agreements as exogenous for more than four 
decades. Implicitly, country-pairs have been viewed as being randomly assigned rather than 
self-selected into RTAs. Only recently have trade economists paid attention to their 
endogeneity when analyzing trade volume effects (Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2006; Magee, 
2003). This line of research indicates that (i) RTAs foster bilateral trade on average when 
controlling for endogeneity and (ii) their exogenous treatment is not justified from an 
econometric viewpoint and leads to downward biased estimates of their impact on trade 
volumes. 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following way. First, in contrast to 
previous work, we use a different methodology and account for the endogeneity of RTA 
membership by employing matching techniques. Second, beyond reassessing the trade 
volume effects (Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2006) with a new empirical approach to 
self-selection into RTA membership, we emphasise an effect of RTA formation that has not 
been considered before. While recent empirical work has stressed the impact of RTAs on 
welfare, trade diversion versus creation as well as the productivity and employment effects of 
RTAs (see Trefler, 2004, for an analysis of the Canada-US free trade agreement)1, it is not yet 
clear what the associated trade structure effects are. Do RTAs mainly stimulate gains from 
specialisation as would be reflected in a growth of the share of inter-industry trade? Or do 
they mainly foster gains associated with scale economies and product differentiation which 
would show up in a growing share of intra-industry trade? It is surprising that these questions 
have not yet surfaced in research on the trade effects of RTA formation. In the 1960s, a 
central issue was whether the formation of the European community between the late 1950s 
and mid 1960s would (driven by gains from inter-industry specialisation) or would not (due to 
increased trade within industries) have important distributional consequences through the 
convergence of wages across countries and lead to an income loss of labour in the capital-
                                                 
1 Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate a substantial positive welfare effect on US consumers through the 
increase in the number of imported varieties between 1972 and 2001. They associate the increased relevance of 
Canada and Mexico as suppliers of varieties to the US economy with formation of the Canada-US free trade 
agreement in 1989 and formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
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abundant economies (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975).2 Given that trade volumes tend to increase if 
country-pairs self-select into RTAs, what are the associated consequences for trade structure? 
It is this paper’s purpose to study this question empirically. 
 
To motivate our empirical analysis, we categorise the major factors steering the welfare 
effects of RTAs based on existing theoretical work. This forms the basis for an empirical 
model to estimate the likelihood of self-selecting into RTAs. Our empirical strategy to deal 
with self-selection into RTA-membership rests on difference-in-difference matching 
techniques that are based on the idea of “selection on observables”. As will become clear 
later, this approach is particularly suited for problems where it is hard to identify any outside 
instruments that are correlated with the treatment variable (in our case, new RTA 
membership) but uncorrelated with the outcome variable (trade volume or trade structure). To 
obtain unbiased estimates of the contemporaneous effects, we consider the impact of new 
RTA membership within a narrowly defined time window around new membership. 
 
For a sample of mainly OECD economies and RTA events since 1970, we estimate an 
endogenous treatment effect of new RTA membership on intra-industry trade shares that 
amounts to about four percentage points when using the preferable estimates. The size of this 
effect is remarkable as the share of intra-industry trade amounts to about eleven percent on 
average in the considered time span and country-sample. The effects on trade volumes are 
similar to the lagged treatment effects reported in Baier and Bergstrand (2006), who use a 
larger sample of countries and a different empirical approach. Furthermore, our results show 
that accounting for self-selection into RTA membership in an appropriate way is 
quantitatively important. For instance, in our sample of 31 mainly developed countries we 
illustrate that the effects of new RTA membership on the change in trade volume are 
downward biased by about 50 percent when relying on a simple difference-in-difference 
estimator instead of using matching techniques. The respective downward bias is even larger 
for the RTA membership effect on the share of intra-industry trade. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature on endogenous RTA formation and its consequences for trade. Section 3 
presents a detailed discussion of the problems and cures of self-selection with particular 
                                                 
2 In this respect, Krugman (1981, pp. 959-960) notes that “much of the expansion of trade in the postwar period 
has taken place without sizable reallocation of resources or income-distribution effects”, which is “particularly 
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emphasis on matching. There, we also discuss our database and the specification of the 
estimated models. Sections 4 and 5 report on the main empirical findings and Section 6 
provides an extensive discussion of their robustness. Section 7 concludes with a brief 
summary of the most important results. 
 
2 Relationship to Existing Literature 
The literature on RTAs is rooted in Viner’s (1950) seminal work on trade creating and trade 
diverting effects of RTAs. Since then, the welfare effects associated with RTAs have formed 
a central block of interest in international economics. In particular, the recent wave of new 
RTA formation has led to a revival of academic research in this area (see Bagwell and Staiger, 
1997; Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos, 2004). According to Baier and Bergstrand (2004), the 
welfare effects of trade liberalisation are influenced by three categories of economic 
determinants: economic geography, inter-industry trade forces, and intra-industry trade forces.  
 
First, the importance of economic geography factors was clearly articulated in Krugman 
(1991) and Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995, 1996). Trade diversion – and, hence, the likelihood 
of a welfare loss from RTAs – is weaker the more remote the integrating countries are from 
the rest of the world (ROW), whilst trade creation should be greater for geographically 
proximate partners. Similar effects of economic geography factors on welfare are identified in 
recent work on RTAs with multinational firms (see Ludema, 2002). As pointed out by 
Bhagwati (1993) and Krishna (2003), the theoretical insight that proximity between trading 
partners renders positive welfare effects of RTA-formation more likely itself builds upon two 
premises, namely that “geographically proximate countries have higher volumes of trade than 
more distant ones do and (...) that trade blocs between countries that already trade 
disproportionately are less likely to divert trade” (Krishna, 2003, pp. 203-204). 
 
Second, if inter-industry trade is quantitatively important, it follows from Heckscher-Ohlin 
type models that trade creation is greater the more different the integrating countries’ relative 
factor endowments are. In this case, an RTA “between a developed and a developing country 
is more likely to improve welfare, because of the substantial underlying difference in factor 
endowments, than an agreement between two developing or two developed countries” 
(Krueger, 1999, p. 116).  
                                                                                                                                                        
noticeable in the cases of the EEC [European Economic Community] and the North American automobile pact”. 
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Third, if intra-industry trade is important, country size becomes a key determinant of the 
welfare effects of RTA formation. Positive effects are more likely the larger and more similar 
the integrating countries are in their economic sizes, while negative welfare effects are 
possible if the size of the ROW is significant (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). Furthermore, 
relative factor endowments are then less important or may even exhibit different effects as in 
a Heckscher-Ohlin model (Levy, 1997). 
 
A final aspect which has so far attracted only little attention in the scientific discussion on 
RTA formation is the role of multinational firms.3 The only theoretical contribution we are 
aware of is Ludema (2002), who shows that higher investment costs render exporting more 
attractive and therefore increase the benefits of bilateral trade liberalisation. In the working 
paper version of our manuscript (Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2005), we set up a general 
equilibrium model with coexisting exporters and horizontal multinational enterprises to study 
the interaction between endowment variables and foreign investment costs. The key findings 
of this analysis confirm the theoretical insights mentioned in the last paragraph: Trade 
liberalisation is more likely beneficial if the involved economies are similar in terms of their 
economic fundamentals (including the level of investment costs). However, if countries differ 
in their (unskilled) labour endowments, the gains from bilateral trade liberalisation are more 
likely positive if the market size advantages of the labour-rich economy are offset by higher 
foreign investment costs. The latter points to a hitherto unexplored interaction effect of labour 
endowments and foreign investment costs in determining the welfare consequences of trade 
liberalisation. 
 
We follow the literature by associating the expectation of positive RTA-induced welfare 
effects with a higher likelihood of a country’s participation in an RTA. Beyond the 
relationship of our work to previous research on the determinants of RTAs, our analysis 
builds on and contributes to previous work on the effects of endogenous RTAs on both trade 
volume and trade structure. While the endogeneity of RTA membership has been recently 
recognised in the literature on the determinants of bilateral trade volume (Baier and 
                                                 
3 This is surprising, since multinationals have come to the limelight in international economics more than two 
decades ago (see Markusen, 1995, 2002, for surveys of that literature) and, in particular, because the literature on 
multinationals identifies “tariff-jumping” as an important motive for foreign direct investment (see Smith, 1987; 
Motta, 1992). 
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Bergstrand, 2002, 2006; Magee, 2003),4 empirical work on the consequences of endogenous 
RTA membership for intra-industry trade is not available. Studies on the determinants of 
intra-industry trade share, to the extent that they account for the role of trade costs at all, 
assume that trade impediments – either measured as iceberg trade costs (in Markusen and 
Maskus, 2002) or tariffs (in Bergstrand, 1990) – are exogenous. That line of research finds 
empirical support for the hypothesis that trade frictions should reduce intra-industry trade but 
it does not explicitly account for RTA effects. 
 
In estimating the trade (volume and structure) effects of endogenous RTAs, we differ from 
previous research regarding the applied econometric method and employ matching 
techniques. Matching explicitly builds on the idea of selection on observables and does not 
require outside instruments. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of matching and its 
advantages over possible alternatives in accounting for endogenous RTA membership. There, 
we also discuss the econometric methods used in previous empirical work on the 
consequences of endogenous RTA formation. 
 
Finally, in contrast to the previous empirical literature on the trade effects of RTAs, we 
account for the role of multinational firms in the following way. Markusen and Maskus 
(2002) point out that the presence of multinational firms generates novel hypotheses about the 
determinants of intra-industry trade. Yet, in contrast to our work they did not consider the 
determinants and consequences of RTA formation. For instance, we investigate how foreign 
investment costs affect the self-selection into RTA membership. Also, we employ a control 
variable to allow for a differential impact of horizontal versus vertical multinational activity 
on both RTA formation and trade (volume and structure).5 Moreover, we use an adjusted 
intra-industry trade index in the empirical analysis to acknowledge that profit repatriation can 
lead to unbalanced goods trade and, in turn, a biased index of intra-industry trade. To see this, 
consider the original Grubel-Lloyd (1971, 1975) index on intra-industry trade share, which 
can be formulated as 
                                                 
4 As pointed out by Baier and Bergstrand (2006), neglecting the endogeneity of RTA formation has severe 
consequences and leads to a substantial downward bias of the effect on trade flows by a factor of five. 
5 Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) suggest using an interaction term between relative factor endowments and 
trade costs to control for the differential impact of trade costs on horizontal versus vertical multinational activity. 
Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2007) rest on this idea and show that such an interaction term is a significant 
determinant of intra-industry trade. This result is consistent with the insights in Markusen and Maskus (2002). 
To the extent that RTA membership and intra-industry trade are coterminous (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004), 
this interaction term should be used as an explanatory variable of RTA formation as well. 
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( )2 min export , import
export import
ijk ijk
ij k
ijk ijkk k
GLI
×= +∑ ∑ ∑  (1) 
where i and j are country indices and k refers to industries. Now consider a simple one-good 
model, where goods trade is balanced by repatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries. Then, the 
Grubel-Lloyd index in (1) deviates from unity although all goods trade occurs within the same 
industry. Following Grubel and Lloyd (1971) and Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2007) we 
can adjust this index for trade imbalances to obtain an unbiased measure of intra-industry 
trade in the presence of multinational firms: 
 
( )2 min export , import
export import export import
ijk ijk
ij k
ijk ijk ijk ijkk k k k
CGLI
×= + − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (2) 
Note that the index gives a value of unity in our example with a single good. 
 
3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
In this section we introduce our database, describe the available econometric techniques to 
avoid self-selection bias, and discuss the empirical approach we use to estimate the impact of 
endogenous RTAs on trade volume and structure (intra-industry trade share). 
 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the role of new RTA membership for bilateral trade 
volumes and bilateral intra-industry trade shares within the OECD. There are several 
advantages using this narrow sample of economies. First, data on trade and the determinants 
of trade and RTA membership are generally more reliable for industrialised countries. Since 
our Grubel-Lloyd index will be constructed from export data only,6 reliance on high-quality 
data is important. Second, OECD country-pairs that are not members of the same RTA are 
more likely to form a relevant control group to compare RTA members with, than non-OECD 
economies.7 The estimation techniques we rely upon assume that included new RTA members 
and the comparison group (i.e., the non-members) are similar enough with respect to the 
determinants of RTA membership. 
                                                 
6 Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2007) provide a comparison of various Grubel-Lloyd-type measures of intra-
industry trade. The analysis there supports the use of a measure that is based on exports only, using data from 
mirror statistics of developed economies. 
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The OECD publishes bilateral export data for 31 reporters at the Standard International Trade 
Classification, Revision 2, in the International Trade by Commodity Statistics. Based on this 
database, we compute trade volumes and export-based intra-industry trade shares for each 
available country-pair and year, relying on 4-digit data. The data are available from 1960 
onwards, but we do not use all recorded observations. In particular, the use of consistent 
annual information on the explanatory variables (physical capital stocks, skilled and low-
skilled labour endowments, and trade and investment costs) limits our data-set to the period 
after 1970. For the sake of consistent estimation, we look at differences in the change of trade 
volumes and the Grubel-Lloyd index between treated (i.e., new RTA members) and untreated 
country-pairs (i.e., those pairs that were not part of the same RTA in a given year). This 
difference-in-difference analysis is able to control for all time-invariant unobserved effects 
and is most likely to yield consistent RTA parameters after controlling for endogenous 
selection. However, it is necessary to focus on equal spacing over time of RTAs in the data-
set. This means that pre-treatment and post-treatment periods should be of equal length for 
both the treated and controls when estimating RTA effects on trade volume and trade 
structure – measured either by the corrected (CGLI) or the uncorrected Grubel-Lloyd index 
(GLI). Thus, we construct a biannual window around the phases where new RTA 
memberships occur and compare the average annual change in trade volume and structure 
between treated and untreated but only for those years with new RTA memberships. Such a 
procedure is necessary to obtain consistent estimates of the contemporaneous effects of RTAs 
by avoiding problems associated with autocorrelation in the data (see Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mulainathan, 2004).8 
 
> Table 1 < 
 
Table 1 lists the 96 new RTA memberships covered by the data, sorted chronologically. Note 
that there is no exit from RTAs in the data. Therefore, we can think of the selection model as 
a cross-section of new RTA membership events. Our difference-in-difference set-up requires 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Our country sample includes 29 OECD members, Hong Kong, and China. A detailed description of the country 
sample can be found in the Appendix. 
8 Note that in Baier and Bergstrand (2006) new RTA membership is unequally spaced within their five year-time 
intervals. Hence, new RTA membership may occur at the beginning or at the end of the interval so that the 
estimates of the contemporaneous effects account for weighted time-aggregated effects of RTAs on trade 
volumes. This can be overcome by constructing the database such that identical spell lengths are considered 
around each new membership. 
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that we skip all data except those around the six years with new RTA formation. Hence, we 
construct differences in bilateral trade volumes and bilateral Grubel-Lloyd indices (DCGLI 
for the corrected and DGLI for the uncorrected index) over the periods 1976-77, 1980-81, 
1985-86, 1988-89, 1993-94, and 1994-95, in order to estimate the contemporaneous effects of 
endogenous new RTA membership (see above). 
 
> Table 2 < 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the selection model. 
In general, we rely on lagged levels that are assumed predetermined to explain new RTA 
membership. The basic variables (GLI, GDP, L, H, K, TC, IC, Dut) and their sources are 
introduced in the Appendix. Before proceeding with the application, we provide a brief 
discussion of the general problem of self-selection and its possible cures. 
 
3.2 Self-Selection into RTA Membership: Problems and Cures 
As outlined in Section 2, existing general equilibrium models of trade are explicit about the 
endogenous formation of RTAs (see Section 2 and Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, for an 
overview). One observation from this line of research is that market size, factor endowments, 
and transport costs determine the associated welfare effects and, hence, the “likelihood” of 
RTA membership. In the presence of multinational firms, investment costs become relevant 
as well. This implies that the economic fundamentals that determine trade volumes and trade 
structure at the bilateral level also determine the likelihood of RTA membership.  
 
Membership is typically captured by a dummy variable set at one if two countries participate 
in the same RTA (in a given year) and zero otherwise. We could think of this as an indicator 
variable that is one if some latent variable exceeds a critical value. If RTA membership is 
randomly assigned to country-pairs, we can estimate the (exogenous treatment) effect of RTA 
membership on intra-industry trade shares or trade volumes simply by OLS. If there is self-
selection into new RTA membership, this is not the case anymore. Then, we have to explicitly 
account for self-selection to retrieve unbiased estimates of the RTA effect. 
 
There are several possibilities to overcome self-selection bias when estimating the treatment 
effects on some outcome variable. Most of the available techniques are rooted in the program 
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evaluation literature. Previous research on endogenous RTA effects on trade applied two 
different approaches. Magee (2003) employs a system estimation approach suited for cross-
sectional data that relies on the idea of instrumental variable techniques. Instrumental variable 
procedures apply strong assumptions about functional form, and typically assume the 
existence of identifying instruments that are correlated with the selection indicator but not 
directly with the outcome. The latter assumption seems generally violated in a general 
equilibrium model, where all exogenous variables jointly determine both the likelihood of 
RTA membership and trade (volume and structure).9 Baier and Bergstrand (2006) employ a 
fixed effects panel model and, alternatively, OLS on differenced data. This procedure, 
however, gives unbiased estimates only if new RTA membership is uncorrelated with the 
time-variant error term. If this assumption is violated, the results are affected by a bias from 
endogenous self-selection similar to a simple OLS model (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 637f.). 
 
We use an alternative approach by applying matching techniques, which assume ignorability 
of treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) or conditional mean independence (Wooldridge, 
2002). In informal accounts we might say that any possible correlation between the outcome 
(e.g., changes in trade volume or trade structure) of the treated and the untreated can then be 
eliminated by conditioning on a vector of observable variables. This is why several authors 
have labelled related procedures as ones of selection on observables (Heckman and Robb, 
1985; Moffitt, 1996).10 
 
Note that it is impractical to directly match on many explanatory variables due to the “curse 
of dimensionality”. Therefore, similarity is defined according to some metric that maps the 
vector of observables into a univariate measure. However, a large number of covariates 
constitutes a problem, since matching estimators include a bias term of stochastic order N-1/k 
with N being the number of observations and k denoting the number of covariates. In small 
                                                 
9 For instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2006, p. 14) conclude that the instrumental variables approach “is not a 
reliable method for addressing the endogeneity bias of the FTA [free trade area] binary variable in a gravity 
equation, despite trying a wide array of economic and political instrumental variables”. 
10 Other available estimators to avoid self-selection bias are switching regression procedures, where so-called 
inverse Mills’ ratios (one or more) based on the predictions of the selection equation are used in the outcome 
model to eliminate the bias (see Heckman, 1978), just-identified instrumental variable procedures that use the 
estimated selection probabilities as an instrument, or control function procedures (see Wooldridge, 2002). 
Control function procedures assume additive separability of the treatment effect and the control function. They 
naturally provide estimates of the average treatment effect (ATE; i.e., the expected impact of new RTA 
membership on trade volume and trade structure of a randomly drawn country-pair in the sample) but not of the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT; i.e., the expected RTA effect on trade volume and trade structure 
of a country-pair randomly drawn from the group of country-pairs that actually entered an RTA), which is in the 
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samples, the associated bias can be substantial (see Frölich, 2004). To overcome this problem, 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) suggest a bias-correction that renders the matching estimator N1/2-
consistent and asymptotically normal. Given this, the difference-in-difference treatment effect 
of, e.g., new RTA membership on the Grubel-Lloyd index can be estimated by comparing the 
differential change in GLI (CGLI) between the treatment group and the properly constructed 
control group according to the metric used for matching. 
 
The most commonly used, unit-free metrics for matching are the Mahalanobis distance metric 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, Rosenbaum, 1995) and the propensity score metric 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Mahalanobis distance matching weights each coordinate of 
the matrix of covariates proportionately by the inverse variance of that variable.11 With 
propensity score matching, treatment selection is specified by either a logit or a probit model, 
starting with a latent variable model of the form 
 * *, 1[ 0]RTA e RTA RTA= + = >xβ  (3) 
where e is a continuously distributed error term symmetric about zero and independent of x, 
the vector of explanatory variables (the “observables”). The probability model to be estimated 
can be written as 
 *( 1 | ) ( 0 | )P RTA P RTA= = >x x . (4) 
An essential assumption for matching on the propensity score is that the estimated score is 
smaller than unity throughout. In empirical applications this will commonly lead to a loss of 
those observations that are (un)treated with certainty. Hence, there is a trade-off between 
goodness of fit in the selection model and the number of usable observations with support. 
 
The probability model provides us with an estimate of the propensity score p(x). In our case, 
the latter is to be interpreted as the likelihood of entering an RTA, conditional on the 
observables. Note that any univariate metric will only establish a useful measure of similarity, 
if the treated units (new RTA members) and the control units (the comparable subgroup of 
non-members) are similar with respect to every observable determining the metric. In the 
matching literature, this is sometimes referred to as the “balancing property”. Otherwise, 
classifying some control country-pair as being similar to a treated one according to the chosen 
                                                                                                                                                        
focus of this paper. See Baier and Bergstrand (2006) for a critical discussion on the use of control function 
techniques, when analysing the trade effects of endogenous RTA formation. 
11 After randomly ordering the country-pairs, the Mahalanobis distance between treated pair k and untreated pair 
l is defined as 1( , ) ( ) ( )k l k lM k l
−′= − −x x C x x , where kx  and lx  are vectors of the observable variables for k 
and l, and C is the sample covariance matrix of the observables from the set of all untreated pairs 
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metric can be misleading. To avoid the associated bias, Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) 
suggest conditioning on those observables in the treatment effect model, for which the 
balancing property is violated. 
 
The vector of estimated propensity scores pˆ( )x  is used to construct an appropriate control 
group of non-RTA-member country-pairs with a similar probability of new RTA membership 
as the actual new RTA members. A single or several similar untreated country-pairs can be 
matched to each new RTA member. The number of matched control units is either 
exogenously imposed (in k-nearest neighbour matching estimators such as one-to-one 
matching) or a critical interval is determined with all untreated countries in the corresponding 
region around a treated observation’s propensity score selected into the control group. Some 
estimators even use a large amount of or all untreated units as controls with their weight 
declining in the absolute difference to a treated unit’s propensity score.  
 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT – see Footnote 10) with one-to-one 
matching is equivalent to running a weighted least squares regression of DCGLI, DGLI, or 
differenced trade volume on RTA where a frequency weight is assigned to all treated (each of 
them gets weight one) and control units (a control unit gets a weight corresponding to the 
number of treated units it was matched onto) and zero to all other untreated observations. 
Hence, there are as many control observations as treated ones. This may involve a dramatic 
decline in the number of observations to estimate ATT. Accordingly the quality of one-to-one 
matching comes at the cost of a loss in efficiency. This shortcoming is overcome by matching 
more than just one untreated pair – e.g., five-nearest neighbours – to each treated country-pair 
by assigning the same weight to each of these k-nearest untreated observations regardless of 
how close they are in terms of their propensity score. This can be further improved by 
determining a radius around each treated country-pair’s propensity score. In our case, we 
choose a radius of 0.1 (i.e., ten percentage points of the likelihood of becoming a new RTA 
member); within that untreated pairs would be selected into the control group. This implies an 
endogenous number of matched controls for each treated unit. Accordingly, the treated will 
differ in terms of the number of matched controls.  
 
Finally, kernel density matching assigns weights that decline in the propensity score 
difference of the target observation to the controls. In large samples, k-nearest neighbour 
matching, radius matching and kernel matching are consistent, since the local neighbourhood 
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of the propensity score for a target observation declines with sample size (see Frölich, 2004). 
In small samples, the efficiency loss with one-to-one matching or the bias from less exact 
matching can be serious. 
 
In Section 5, we employ four different matching estimators based on propensity score (one-to-
one matching, five-nearest neighbour matching, radius matching and kernel density 
matching). In addition, we employ one-to-one matching and five-nearest neighbour matching 
based on the Mahalanobis distance metric to obtain a robust picture of the effect of new RTA 
membership on trade volume and trade structure. However, before turning to the trade effects 
of endogenous RTAs, we estimate the propensity of self-selection into RTA membership in 
Section 4. This provides us with novel insights on the main economic determinants of new 
RTA membership. 
 
4 Estimating Self-Selection into New RTA Membership 
Table 3 summarises the results of various probit model specifications for new RTA 
membership. In Probits 1-5, we use a common trend and in 6-10 we include time dummies. 
Probits 1 and 6 use size variables of the same functional form as Helpman (1987), who 
estimates the determinants of trade structure. Similarity of country size is measured by the 
similarity of bilateral GDP. This has a positive sign in all specifications, which is in line with 
theory, pointing to a higher likelihood of RTA membership for similarly sized economies (see 
Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, p. 47).12 
 
> Table 3 < 
 
In Probits 2-5 and 7-10, we employ similarity indices of all three factors. The literature is not 
conclusive about the nexus between relative factor endowment differences and the likelihood 
of RTA membership (see Section 2). In our empirical application, the coefficient of low-
skilled labour is significantly positive, that of human capital is insignificant, and that of 
physical capital significantly negative. Note that human capital might enter insignificantly due 
to its high correlation with physical capital.13 Alternatively, in Probits 1 and 6 we have 
                                                 
12 Note that the negative significant impact of total bilateral GDP is difficult to explain against the background of 
the theoretical results discussed in Section 2 
13 The insignificance could also be due to measurement problems with this variable. However, alternative data 
are not available at the required annual level for the time span under consideration. 
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deployed a specification using absolute differences in skilled-to-unskilled labour endowments 
and in capital-to-unskilled labour endowments instead of each factor endowment separately. 
Then, the coefficient of the former is significantly negative and that of the latter is 
insignificantly positive (similar to the capital-labour coefficient in Baier and Bergstrand, 
2004). However, this result does not provide support for Krueger’s (1999, p. 116) hypothesis 
that an RTA “between a developed and a developing country is more likely to improve 
welfare”, as our country sample mainly covers OECD members. 
 
The bilateral trade cost variable tends to have a negative impact on the probability of joining 
an RTA (see Probits 1-4 and 6-9). This result is consistent with the argument in Ludema 
(2002, p. 336) that “geographical proximity facilitates trade policy coordination”. To account 
for the impact of multinational firms on the likelihood of RTA formation, we include 
investment costs in the set of control variables. In line with the discussion in Section 2, we 
employ the average size of and absolute difference in bilateral investment costs as well as an 
interaction term between low-skilled labour endowment similarity and the investment cost 
ratio as determinants of new RTA membership. The empirical results indicate that all three 
variables enter significantly, and their coefficients are positive.14 Interestingly, when 
accounting for interaction terms between endowment variables and bilateral transport costs to 
control for the prevalence of vertical multinational enterprises (see Section 2), the impact of 
trade costs becomes insignificant (see Probit 5 and Probit 10). However, as the interaction 
terms are insignificant as well, this points to a high collinearity between the respective control 
variables, rendering their interpretation difficult. 
 
Finally, we included duties as separate control variables. Although their use is not motivated 
by the discussion in Section 2, we employ the initial level of duties as a control for a country-
pair’s attitude towards trade liberalisation. A negative sign of the respective coefficients 
indicates that higher initial duties render RTA formation less likely. The results in Table 3 
show that RTA formation can be much better explained after including duties (see the 
corresponding Pseudo R2s).15 
 
                                                 
14 We have also estimated specifications that included an interaction term between the similarity in capital 
endowment and investment costs. However, the respective coefficient turned out to be insignificant. 
15 Note, however, that the exclusion of duties as control variables would only have a minor impact on the trade 
effects of RTAs. In particular, this would not change our findings in qualitative terms. 
 15  
Since Probit 9 performs best in terms of explanatory power, it is a natural candidate to rely 
upon with propensity score matching.16 MacFadden’s Pseudo R2 indicates that the 
explanatory power of the model is high. In addition, we can note that the null hypothesis of 
the similarity of the samples of the treated and control observations with respect to the 
separate explanatory variables is not rejected (see Table A3 in the working paper version of 
this manuscript; Egger, Egger and Greenaway, 2005). Hence, there is no indication of a 
violation of the balancing property which suggests that the (probit-based) propensity score 
metric is an unbiased measure of the similarity between the treated and control units. 
 
5 Effect of RTA Membership on Trade Volume and Trade Structure 
To estimate the difference-in-difference treatment effect of new RTA membership, we 
employ several matching estimators and a descriptive comparison estimator. The descriptive 
comparison is simply an OLS regression of DCGLI, DGLI or differenced trade volume on 
RTA. The first two matching estimators – one-to-one matching and five-nearest neighbour 
matching – rely on the Mahalanobis distance metric. These are bias-corrected as suggested by 
Abadie and Imbens (2006).17 The others are based on the propensity score: one-to-one 
matching, five-nearest neighbour matching, radius matching, and kernel matching. We apply 
each matching approach and, additionally, the descriptive comparison as the benchmark 
estimator to trade volumes (third column) and two different concepts of the intra-industry 
trade share index: the uncorrected Grubel-Lloyd index (column 1) and the corrected Grubel-
Lloyd index (column 2). To avoid any bias associated with violation of the balancing property 
or the omission of relevant determinants of trade (volume and structure), we additionally 
control for the observables in the treatment effect regressions based on propensity score 
matching (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002).18  
 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that Probit 7-10 (and, similarly, Probit 2-5) can be tested against each other based on 
likelihood ratio tests. For instance, Probits 7 and 8 are rejected against Probit 9, whereas Probit 9 is not rejected 
against Probit 10 at the 10% significance level. We also could have used logit models instead of probits to 
estimate the propensity score. Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) suggest to test probit and logit against each 
other based on a likelihood ratio test. According to the test statistics summarised in Table 3, Logits 1 and 2 are 
rejected against their probit counterparts. The other logits perform at least as well as their probit counterparts 
(results are available from the authors upon request). In the sensitivity analysis below we illustrate that the logit 
and the probit models result in very similar estimates of the endogenous RTA effect on intra-industry trade 
share. 
17 We do not apply the bias correction with propensity score matching, but we control for the observables in the 
treatment effect model based on matching (see below). 
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> Table 4 < 
 
The ATT effects of new RTA membership are reported in Table 4. The findings for the trade 
structure effects can be summarised as follows. First, for our difference-in-difference analysis 
it seems of minor importance whether the corrected or uncorrected Grubel-Lloyd index is 
used. The reason for this is that the average annual change in CGLI is small as it is for 
multilateral trade imbalances. Second, the descriptive comparison estimates that ignore 
selection on observables point to a positive impact on the intra-industry trade share of about 
0.6 to 0.8 percentage points which is not significantly different from zero. Third, relying on a 
simple difference-in-difference estimator without additionally accounting for self-selection 
into new RTA membership leads to a downward-biased estimate of the impact on either 
index. Depending on the matching estimator, this downward bias is estimated at between 62 
percent (propensity-score-based one-to-one matching) and 86 percent (bias-adjusted one-to-
one matching) for CGLI. 
 
Since the number of covariates is relatively large, this could affect the quality of the 
propensity score estimates. Hence, the bias-adjusted Mahalanobis metric-based estimates 
might be more trustworthy. The impact of new RTA membership seems quantitatively 
important and amounts to about four percentage points (bias-adjusted one-to-one matching). 
This is remarkable (i) because the share of intra-industry trade amounts to about eleven 
percent on average in the considered time span and country sample and (ii) because we know 
from Table 2 that the average change in the two intra-industry trade share indices was rather 
small and negative around new RTA membership events. A positive effect of RTA 
membership is consistent with insights from Bergstrand (1990) and Markusen and Maskus 
(2002), who investigate the role of trade costs for the intra-industry trade share (see Section 
2). 
 
Beyond the trade structure effects, Table 4 also reports estimates for a trade volume 
regression. The respective results (reported in column three) allow a comparison with trade 
volume effects previously found in the literature on the consequences of endogenous RTAs. 
Since the approach by Baier and Bergstrand (2006) is closest to ours in focussing on new 
RTA membership, we confine our comparison to their work. 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 The treatment effect models condition on the covariates used in the selection models, including fixed time 
effects. The latter ensure that the treatment effects do not pick up changes in the mean of trade volumes or intra-
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For a comparison, two remarks are in order. First, we focus on more or less contemporaneous 
effects of RTAs, throughout.19 Hence, their impact may eventually be larger after some 
“phasing-in” period. However, we do not account for this since it may be difficult to isolate 
the effect of RTAs in later periods from the impact of other sources. Second, we consider a 
narrowly defined set of industrialised economies for data quality reasons. Third, we consider 
new RTA events after 1970 for data reasons. With this approach at hand and using bias-
adjusted one-to-one matching estimates, we identify an RTA-induced trade volume effect that 
is close to the lagged RTA effect of 0.19 estimated by Baier and Bergstrand (2006) in 
specification (3) of their Table 6 (this specification is best comparable to our analysis by 
concept). This is notable as Baier and Bergstrand (2006) use a larger country sample and a 
different empirical approach (see Subsection 3.2). However, the difference between the bias-
adjusted one-to-one matching estimate and the descriptive comparison estimate in the third 
column of Table 4 is large enough to conclude that the self-selection bias is not eliminated by 
relying on a simple difference-in-difference estimator instead of matching techniques. The 
downward bias of about 50 percent in the estimated trade volume effects of new RTA 
membership shows again that accounting for selection into RTA membership in an 
appropriate way is quantitatively important. 
 
6 Robustness of the RTA Effect on Intra-Industry Trade Shares 
We assess robustness of the estimated RTA effects in various ways, thereby concentrating on 
trade structure effects, which are this paper’s focus. First, with respect to (i) the omission of 
bilateral economic variables, (ii) the use of logit selection models instead of their probit 
counterparts, and (iii) block matching as an alternative to the methods used in the previous 
subsection. Table 5 investigates these when using the change in the trade-imbalance-corrected 
index (DCGLI) as the outcome variable.20 Second, we study the relevance of omission of 
potentially relevant political variables. Third, we consider the role of interdependence of the 
country-pairs with respect to observable characteristics. Fourth, we treat the EU member 
countries as an artificial single economy to acknowledge that a new member cannot eliminate 
tariffs bilaterally with a subset of the EU countries. Fifth, we compare the ATT with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
industry trade shares but that they are identified only from the variance of a given year-to-year change. 
19 Note that the estimates indicate the log-change in trade volumes associated with a new RTA membership after 
one year. 
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average treatment effect (ATE – see Footnote 10). Sixth, we allow ATT to vary across 
country-pairs depending on the included observable characteristics. Finally, we assess the 
impact of a new RTA membership on intra-industry trade for each 2-digit SITC category 
separately. 
 
6.1 Omission of Relevant Bilateral Economic Variables, Logit vs. Probit, and Block 
Matching 
Using logit instead of probit models with propensity score matching has no influence on the 
treatment effects. This can be seen from comparing the different estimates for Logit 9 in 
Table 5 with their respective counterparts in the first column of Table 4. The ATT estimates 
in Table 4 are very robust to alternative model specifications regarding the coverage of 
economic determinants as in Table 3. This is indicated by the respective estimates for Logits 9 
and 10 in Table 5. ATT is insignificant only if relevant economic observables are not 
controlled for in the case of one-to-one matching (for instance, when using the excessively 
parsimonious binary choice selection Models 6 and 7 in Table 3). Detailed results are 
available from the authors upon request. Finally, using block matching instead of nearest-
neighbour, radius, or kernel matching, yields very similar results as other matching 
estimators. This can bee seen from a comparison of the results at the bottom of Table 5 with 
the remaining ones. 
 
> Table 5 < 
 
Based on the levels of log-likelihood and corresponding likelihood ratio tests, Logit 9 is 
preferable to the estimated alternatives (probits and logits). Due to the possible relevance of a 
bias-correction in our sample, the Mahalanobis-metric-based one-to-one estimator in the spirit 
of Abadie and Imbens (2006) seems particularly reliable among those applied in our analysis. 
 
6.2 Omission of Relevant Political Variables 
By focussing on economic determinants of RTA formation, we have not yet accounted for the 
role of political variables. However, from the empirical results in Magee (2003) and Baier and 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 We only report the results for Models 9 and 10 since the others are rejected against these alternatives. The 
corresponding results for the uncorrected DGLI are very similar and available from the authors upon request. 
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Bergstrand (2004) we know that inclusion of such variables may be important. Therefore, we 
have estimated models which include political variables as determinants of RTA formation 
(see Table A1 in Appendix), with the respective trade structure effects being reported in the 
last but one column of Table 5. To avoid arbitrariness, we consider only those political 
determinants that are either recommended by (mainly theoretical) studies on endogenous trade 
policy or that have been shown to be important in previous empirical work on RTA 
formation. The data on these variables are available at an annual basis from The World Bank 
(Beck, Clarke, Groffe, Keefer, and Walsh, 2001, 2004) and from the Polity IV Project data-set 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). In most cases, we employ the political control variables for 
each country separately, using bilateral minimum and maximum values of the corresponding 
indicator. The Appendix provides further details. 
 
In the theoretical literature on RTA formation, lobbying for protectionism has been 
emphasised as being important (Grossman and Helpman, 1995, Ornelas, 2005). 
Unfortunately, a reliable data-set on lobbying activities is not available for the underlying 
country sample. Therefore, we are restricted to the usage of indirect measures. According to 
Biglaiser and Brown (2001), a higher degree of fractionalisation of legislature renders 
lobbying more difficult and therefore reduces trade protection. Hence, we include 
fractionalisation as one political indicator and expect a positive coefficient for its effect on 
RTA formation. This hypothesis finds support in our data-set, as only the positive coefficient 
of the bilateral minimum variable is significant in the selection model (see Table A1 in 
Appendix). A further obstacle to lobbying is the political control through checks and balances 
(see Persson, 1998). Again our empirical results lend support to this hypothesis, due to a 
positive and significant impact of the bilateral minimum ‘checks and balances’ variable. 
However, as pointed out by Persson, Roland, and Tabelini (1997), checks and balances are 
only effective if there is a conflict of interest between the decision maker and the relevant 
control authority. This renders the degree of polarisation a further determinant of a political 
control system. Testa (2003, p. 29) strengthens this argument by noting that “the cost of 
bribing is increasing in the distance between the incumbent legislator and the opponent”. The 
reason is that policy makers themselves have preferences about specific policies. Being 
reelected ensures continuation of their preferred policy. The more polarised the political 
parties are, the higher is the loss of being not reelected and the less susceptible is a policy 
maker to intervention by lobbies. On the other hand, there is some evidence that more 
polarised legislatures render an agreement on policy reforms more difficult to achieve 
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(Biglaiser and Brown, 2001), so that the overall impact of polarisation on trade regionalism is 
unclear from a theoretical point of view. Our empirical results show that both the bilateral 
minimum and the bilateral maximum index of polarisation exhibit a negative (though not 
always significant) impact on the likelihood of RTA formation, lending support to the second 
hypothesis. 
 
In addition to political variables that are motivated by research on lobbying, we have also 
accounted for other ones that have been put forward in the political science literature on trade 
liberalisation. First, following Frye and Mansfield (2004), political change can be an 
instigator of policy reforms through the establishment of democratic institutions – e.g. in post-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we use a durability indicator, 
which reflects the number of years since the last (greater) regime change as a control variable. 
The negative coefficients of the bilateral minimum and maximum variables lend support to 
the hypothesis that regime change matters. Furthermore, it is a well established result that 
“politicians are most likely to reduce trade barriers immediately after voters go to the polls” 
(Frye and Mansfield, 2004, p. 371).21 This view, again, finds support in the empirical results 
(at least with respect to the significant negative impact of the ‘minimum years in office of 
chief executive’ variable). 
 
A final set of political variables is employed to control for the symmetry in the political 
system of countries or the political orientation of governments. A hypothesis for the role of 
symmetry in political variables can be derived from the finding of Magee (2003) that the 
likelihood of RTA formation between two countries increases if both of them are 
democracies. We find support for the ‘symmetry matters’ hypothesis in our selection models, 
with the results reported in Table A1 in the Appendix (e.g., note the positive impact of a left-
wing government if the other country is left-wing, too; and similarly for right-wing 
governments).22 
 
                                                 
21 One explanation for an early implementation is that policy reforms have short-run costs (see Rodrik, 1996, for 
a critical discussion). A further argument is that “a honeymoon period also provides newly elected policy makers 
a certain degree of insulation, (...) blaming the outgoing government for its problems in addition to having a 
longer time horizon” (see Biglaiser and Brown, 2001).  
22 The finding that political orientation (right-wing or left-wing) per se has no significant impact on the 
likelihood of RTA formation is well in line with previous insights on the determinants of trade reforms (see 
Rodrik, 1996). In a recent paper, Dutt and Mitra (2005, p. 59) show that “left-wing governments will adopt more 
protectionist trade policies in capital-rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor-rich countries, 
than right-wing ones”. 
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Since political variables are significant determinants of self-selection into RTAs, it is of 
interest to what extent their inclusion affects the ATT estimates of new RTA membership on 
intra-industry trade shares. As can be seen from Table 5, it turns out that the difference 
between the original estimates and the ones based on the political variable augmented 
selection model is rather small, in particular, if the propensity score metric is applied 
(compare the results for Logit 9 with those of the column labelled as “Logita)”). One major 
reason for this might be seen in the correlation between the political and the trade and 
investment cost variables. Hence, the relationship in the propensity scores among country-
pairs is largely unaffected, leading only to a small change in the effect on intra-industry trade 
shares. 
 
6.3 Omitted Interdependence 
In the previous analysis, we assumed that new RTA membership only depends on bilateral 
determinants. In a multilateral world, we would expect that third-country variables influence 
both new RTA membership as well as the bilateral intra-industry trade share (see also Baier 
and Bergstrand, 2004, for such an argument). To take this issue into account, we constructed 
GDP-weighted third-market observables for each country-pair.23 This assumes that the 
interdependence of country-pairs is positively related to market size. Accounting for third-
country variables (the weighted market size, factor endowments, trade costs, etc.) increases 
the set of explanatory variables substantially, but the probit and logit models can still be 
estimated. They are summarised in the columns “Probitc)” and “Logitc)” in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. 
 
The associated ATT estimates for the preferred Logit model are given in the column labelled 
“Logitb)” in Table 5. First of all, it should be noted that with the large number of explanatory 
variables at hand, we should think of the Abadie and Imbens (2006) bias-corrected estimates 
as the most reliable ones (see the top rows in Table 5). The one-to-one bias-adjusted matching 
estimate is somewhat lower than the baseline estimate in Logit 9. Also the propensity-score-
                                                 
23 It is not feasible to explicitly account for interdependence beyond third-market observables with matching. 
Hence, we impose the standard assumption that there is no direct interdependence – i.e., there is no effect of 
third countries’ entering an RTA on DCGLI of a given country-pair beyond what can be explained by third-
market weighted explanatory variables. However, even in the presence of direct interdependence one could 
estimate the impact of entering an RTA on DCGLI of the treated relative to the (comparable) control country-
pairs. For the interpretation one would then have to bear in mind that the effects are associated with multiple 
RTA treatments where the impact on a specific country-pair also depends on the RTA formation of third 
countries (see Diamond, 2006, for a broader discussion of this issue). 
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based matching estimates are somewhat lower than the ones in Logit 9. It should be noted that 
with propensity-score-based matching we control for the observables in addition to new RTA 
membership in the treatment effects model. Hence, the GDP-weighted third-country variables 
contribute to the change in the Grubel-Lloyd index on their own. Overall, we may conclude 
that accounting for the market-size-related interdependence of country-pairs does not affect 
our results qualitatively. 
 
6.4 Treating EU Member Countries as if They Were a Single Economy 
So far, we considered a country’s joining the EU in, say, year t as a new set of RTAs with all 
EU members of year t-1. Hence, it had been ignored that any country has to join either with 
all previous members or not at all (note that this is not true for free trade agreements and even 
not for all customs unions notified to the WTO). We assess the relevance of this issue by 
collapsing all EU countries into a single, artificial economy in the selection equation. This 
enforces any EU enlargement to show up in the treatment group only once for each new EU 
member country. Then, we proceed as before to determine similar country-pairs according to 
the propensity score metric or the Mahalanobis distance metric and estimate the ATT of new 
RTA memberships. With this procedure, the number of observations available in the selection 
model reduces to 1,135. We may summarise the propensity-score-based ATTs regarding the 
change in the corrected Grubel-Lloyd index as follows (the results are not reported in a table 
for the sake of brevity): nearest neighbour matching ~ 0.035; five-nearest-neighbour matching 
~ 0.032; radius matching ~ 0.035; kernel matching ~ 0.034. The Mahalanobis distance-based 
one-to-one matching estimate is ~ 0.042. All of the reported estimates are significant at one 
percent. Hence, the difference to the estimates reported in the first column of Table 4 is small. 
 
6.5 Estimation of Average Treatment Effects (ATE) 
Is the treatment effect of the untreated (ATU) – i.e., the RTA effect that would arise from a 
hypothetical membership of the actual non-members on their intra-industry trade shares – 
different from ATT? This can be implicitly answered by looking at the resulting average 
treatment effect (ATE), which is a weighted average of ATT and ATU. The results for the 
preferred, bias-adjusted, nearest-neighbour matching estimators can be summarised as 
follows. Irrespective of whether we apply one-to-one or five-nearest neighbour matching, 
ATE is bigger than ATT, hence, ATU is bigger than ATT. The estimates are higher than the 
ATT effects, irrespective of whether the change in the corrected (DCGLI) or the uncorrected 
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(DGLI) index is considered. The main result of downward-biased RTA effects on intra-
industry trade shares from ignoring selection on observables extends to ATE. For ATE an 
even bigger downward bias is detected than for ATT. The respecitve ATE estimates are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
6.6 Heterogeneous Average Treatment Effects of the Treated (ATT) Across 
Country-Pairs 
So far, we assumed that the treatment effect of the treated is symmetric across country-pairs. 
While it is common to adopt this assumption in empirical work, it is not necessary to do so. In 
fact, we might assume that ATT varies itself with the observables rather than exerting a linear 
impact. For instance, Wooldridge (2002, p. 613) discusses a propensity-score-based 
estimation procedure for an instrumental variables approach. However, it is possible to adopt 
a similar assumption with propensity-score-based matching, too. The results are summarised 
in Table 6. 
 
> Table 6 < 
 
Since there are numerous interaction terms, we report some of the moments (mean, median, 
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum) at the bottom of the table. In general, the 
parameter estimates point in the direction that ATT declines with bilateral country size, 
similarity in bilateral unskilled labour endowments and the level of bilateral trade costs, and it 
increases with similarity in bilateral capital endowment and bilateral investment costs. The 
means of the propensity-score-based ATT estimates are slightly smaller than the original ones 
(see Table 4). The median effect is somewhat higher than the mean, and the standard 
deviation is quite large. For some countries, the change in CGLI (or GLI) might be even 
lower as a response to new RTA membership (this will be the case for large country-pairs 
where unskilled labour endowment differences are relatively low and bilateral trade costs are 
significant). This is illustrated by the minimum effect of about -0.14. Not surprisingly, the 
maximum impact is quite large with an estimated effect of about 0.10. These findings are very 
robust across (propensity-score-based) matching procedures. 
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6.7 Average Treatment Effects of the Treated (ATT) for Separate Goods Categories 
In the previous analysis, we focused on the treatment effect of new RTA membership on a 
country-pair’s overall share in intra-industry trade. Here, we ask which industries (or 
commodity categories) contribute the lion’s share. Our findings are summarised in Table 7.  
 
> Table 7 < 
 
We report ATT based on one-to-one propensity score matching for each SITC two-digit 
industry and, in addition, the one digit industry-specific simple average below the two-digit 
results. One general observation is that in broad terms the impact of RTAs on the intra-
industry trade share tends to be lower for industries which can be classified as homogeneous 
(see the first column block of results in the table) than for industries associated with 
production of differentiated goods (see the second column block of results in the table). Only 
the mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials category seems to be an outlier in this 
respect. 
 
Recent theoretical work points out that a non-trivial share of trade is due to the increasing 
fragmentation of production across borders (Yi, 2003). To some extent, this could happen 
even within narrowly defined industries (recall that we compute intra-industry trade shares at 
the 4-digit level). Then, our finding could imply that RTAs stimulate intra-industry trade not 
only in final but also in intermediate goods. Although this cannot be viewed as a formal test 
of the argument, at the very least, the industries in categories 6, 7 and 8 are ones where we 
would expect trade in differentiated intermediate goods to be important. 
 
7 Conclusions 
A great deal of progress has been made in recent years in the empirical analysis of the impact 
of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on trade. In particular, issues with endogenous selection 
into RTAs have come into the limelight. Recent research has identified a significantly positive 
endogenous treatment effect of RTAs on trade volumes and a potentially sizable downward 
bias of the corresponding exogenous treatment effect. While fundamental issues about the 
trade volume effects of RTAs seem to be settled, at least in qualitative terms, it has not yet 
been asked whether the RTA-induced increase in trade volumes is due mainly to increasing 
inter- versus intra-industry trade. Yet this may be of crucial interest not only from an 
 25  
economic but also from a political point of view. In its early stages, research on intra-industry 
trade developed on the ground of concerns about the potentially detrimental effects of the 
formation of the European Community on labour in the capital-abundant integrating 
economies. The empirical finding of a sizable share in intra-industry trade not only triggered 
research on New Trade Theory but also helped alleviate fears of job loss associated with 
regional integration. 
 
This paper sheds light on the impact of endogenous RTA membership on intra-industry trade 
shares within the OECD since 1970. Most importantly, we detect a positive treatment effect 
on intra-industry trade shares induced by a new RTA membership, which amounts to about 
four percentage points for our preferred estimates. This is sizable when taking into acount that 
the average of intra-industry trade shares amounts to about eleven percent in our country 
sample. In general, we conclude from this that the previously identified RTA-induced 
increase in trade volumes can be mainly attributed to an associated growth in intra-industry 
trade, at least in the developed economies. 
 
Besides economic determinants of self-selection into RTA membership, which have been put 
forward by previous theoretical and empirical work, we have also controlled for the influence 
of political variables. It turns out that political factors are important for RTA membership but 
that omission of these variables does not bias the estimated effect of new RTAs on the intra-
industry trade share significantly. Regarding the sectoral decomposition of the RTA effects, 
we find that the impact of endogenous new RTA membership on the intra-industry trade share 
tends to be lower for industries which can be classifed as more or less homogeneous as 
compared to ones associated with production of differentiated goods. 
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Appendix 
Country Sample 
The regression results are based on bilateral trade flows between the following 31 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA. 
 
Basic Variables and Their Sources 
GLI ~ Grubel-Lloyd-index (OECD, International Trade by Commodity Statistics); GDP ~ 
gross domestic product in real U.S. dollars with base year 1995 (World Bank, World 
Development Indicators); L ~ unskilled labour measured by the labour force (World Bank, 
World Development Indicators); H ~ skilled labour measured by tertiary school enrolment in 
percent (World Bank, World Development Indicators); K ~ physical capital estimated by the 
perpetual inventory method based on gross fixed capital formation (World Bank, World 
 30  
Development Indicators); TC ~ bilateral trade costs measured by the trade-weighted 
c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio (OECD, International Trade by Commodity Statistics); IC ~ investment costs 
(BERI); Dut ~ import duties (World Bank, World Development Indicators). 
 
Appendix Tables and Political Variables Data 
 
> Table A1 < 
 
The political variables are collected from The World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions 
(Beck, Clarke, Groffe, Keefer, and Walsh, 2001, 2004) and from the Polity IV Project data-set 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). We provide a brief summary of the information on the variables 
in use based on these sources. 
 
Data from Beck, Clarke, Groffe, Keefer, and Walsh (2001, 2004): 
The World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions contains 108 variables for 177 countries 
from 1975 onwards. We use the following variables from this source: 
• FRAC: This variable indicates the total fractionalisation of a country’s legislature and 
it reflects the probability that two random draws would produce legislators from 
different parties. We employ this variable for each country by using the bilateral 
maximum and minimum levels separately (“Maximum level of total fractionalisation 
…” and “Minimum level of total fractionalisation …” in Table A1). 
• CHECKS: This variable reflects the number of veto players and therefore indicates 
the degree of political control. We construct two variables, “Maximum index of 
checks and balances” and “Minimum index of checks and balances”. 
• POLARIZ: This variable measures the maximum difference of orientation among the 
parties in government, and it takes on values in between 0 and 2. Again, the maximum 
and minimum levels at the country-pair level are separately employed. 
• YRSOFF: This variable reflects the number of years a country’s chief executive has 
been in office. We employ this variable for each country by using the bilateral 
maximum and minimum levels separately (“Maximum years in office …” and 
“Minimum years in office …” in Table A1). 
• SYSTEM: This variable provides information about the chief executive. It is coded as 
follows: direct presidential system (0), strong president elected by assembly (1), 
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parliamentary (2). We use the difference of this variable between two countries to 
obtain a measure of system similarity (“Same system” in Table A1).  
• 1GOVRLC: This variable indicates whether the largest government party is located at 
the right, the left, or the center of the political spectrum. We construct four dummy 
variables based on this information. They indicate whether only one or both parties of 
a country-pair are right-wing/left-wing. 
 
Data from Marshall and Jaggers (2002): 
The Polity IV Project 2001 reports data for 185 countries from 1800 onwards. We only use a 
single variable from this source, namely DURABLE which is available from 1949 onwards. 
The durability indicator reflects the number of years since the last (greater) regime change 
and, hence, it is a measure of a country’s political system stability. The maximum and 
minimum levels at the country-pair level are separately employed (“Maximum index of 
durability” and “Minimum index of durability” in Table A1). 
 
Table 1: Covered New Regional Trade Agreement Memberships
Country 1 Country 2 Entry Country 1 Country 2 Entry Country 1 Country 2 Entry
Austria Belgium 1977 Italy Portugal 1977 Portugal Spain 1986
Austria Denmark 1977 Italy Sweden 1977 Spain Sweden 1986
Austria France 1977 Netherlands Norway 1977 Spain Switzerland 1986
Austria Ireland 1977 Netherlands Portugal 1977 Spain United Kingdom 1986
Austria Italy 1977 Netherlands Sweden 1977 Canada USA 1989
Austria Netherlands 1977 Norway United Kingdom 1977 Canada Mexico 1994
Austria United Kingdom 1977 Austria Greece 1981 Denmark Hungary 1994
Belgium Finland 1977 Belgium Greece 1981 France Hungary 1994
Belgium Norway 1977 Finland Greece 1981 Germany Hungary 1994
Belgium Portugal 1977 France Greece 1981 Greece Hungary 1994
Belgium Sweden 1977 Germany Greece 1981 Hungary Ireland 1994
Denmark Finland 1977 Greece Iceland 1981 Hungary Italy 1994
Denmark Iceland 1977 Greece Ireland 1981 Hungary Netherlands 1994
Denmark Norway 1977 Greece Italy 1981 Hungary Portugal 1994
Denmark Portugal 1977 Greece Netherlands 1981 Hungary Spain 1994
Denmark Sweden 1977 Greece Norway 1981 Hungary United Kingdom 1994
Finland France 1977 Greece Portugal 1981 Mexico USA 1994
Finland Germany 1977 Greece Sweden 1981 Austria Czech Republic 1995
Finland Ireland 1977 Greece Switzerland 1981 Austria Hungary 1995
Finland Italy 1977 Greece United Kingdom 1981 Czech Republic Denmark 1995
Finland Netherlands 1977 Austria Spain 1986 Czech Republic Finland 1995
Finland United Kingdom 1977 Belgium Spain 1986 Czech Republic France 1995
France Norway 1977 Denmark Spain 1986 Czech Republic Germany 1995
France Portugal 1977 Finland Spain 1986 Czech Republic Greece 1995
Germany Iceland 1977 France Spain 1986 Czech Republic Ireland 1995
Germany Norway 1977 Germany Spain 1986 Czech Republic Italy 1995
Iceland Ireland 1977 Greece Spain 1986 Czech Republic Netherlands 1995
Iceland United Kingdom 1977 Iceland Spain 1986 Czech Republic Portugal 1995
Ireland Norway 1977 Ireland Spain 1986 Czech Republic Sweden 1995
Ireland Portugal 1977 Italy Spain 1986 Czech Republic United Kingdom 1995
Ireland Sweden 1977 Netherlands Spain 1986 Finland Hungary 1995
Italy Norway 1977 Norway Spain 1986 Hungary Sweden 1995
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Total bilateral GDP: ln TGDPij,t-1:=ln(GDPi,t-1+GDPj,t-1) 1647 27.273 1.331 23.835 30.099
Similarity in bilateral GDP: ln SGDPij,t-1:=ln{1-[GDPi,t-1/(GDPi,t-1+GDPj,t-1)]
2-[GDPi,t-1/(GDPi,t-1+GDPj,t-1)]
2} 1647 -1.591 0.997 -6.204 -0.693
Similarity in bilateral unskilled endowment: ln SLij,t-1:=ln{1-[Li,t-1/(Li,t-1+Lj,t-1)]
2-[Li,t-1/(Li,t-1+Lj,t-1)]
2} 1647 -1.607 1.024 -6.124 -0.693
Similarity in bilateral skilled endowment: ln SHij,t-1:=ln{1-[Hi,t-1/(Hi,t-1+Hj,t-1)]
2-[Hi,t-1/(Hi,t-1+Hj,t-1)]
2} 1647 -0.864 0.277 -2.531 -0.693
Similarity in bilateral capital endowment: ln SKij,t-1:=ln{1-[Ki,t-1/(Ki,t-1+Kj,t-1)]
2-[Ki,t-1/(Ki,t-1+Kj,t-1)]
2} 1647 -1.581 0.964 -6.095 -0.693
Absolute bilateral difference in skilled-to-unskilled endowment ratios: AHLij,t-1:=|(Hi,t-1/Li,t-1)-(Hj,t-1/Lj,t-1)| 1647 21.498 17.172 0.000 85.530
Absolute bilateral difference in capital-to-unskilled endowment ratios: AKLij,t-1:=|ln(Ki,t-1/Li,t-1)-ln(Kj,t-1/Lj,t-1)| 1647 0.784 0.833 0.002 3.418
Bilateral trade costs: TCij,t-1 1647 1.060 0.102 0.786 1.287
Interaction term: ln SLij,t-1×TCij,t-1 1647 -1.727 1.178 -7.520 -0.546
Interaction term: ln SKij,t-1×TCij,t-1 1647 -1.688 1.073 -7.488 -0.545
Average bilateral investment costs:0.5*ICi,t-1+0.5*ICj,t-1 1647 37.218 6.346 21.160 58.099
Absolute difference in bilateral investment costs: abs(ICi,t-1-ICj,t-1) 1647 10.315 7.407 0.036 33.183
Interaction term: ln SLij,t-1×(ICi,t-1/ICj,t-1) if Lj,t-1>Li,t-1 else ln SLij,t-1×(ICj,t-1/ICi,t-1) 1647 -1.635 1.396 -13.839 -0.351
Exporter duties: Duti,t-1 1469 3.419 3.334 0.000 14.920
Importer duties: Dutj,t-1 1469 3.436 3.353 0.000 14.920
Change in bilateral Grubel-Lloyd index: DGLIijt 1587 -0.010 0.082 -0.640 0.259
Change in trade-imbalance-adjusted bilateral Grubel-Lloyd index: DCGLIijt 1587 -0.011 0.087 -0.716 0.275
Change in ln bilateral trade volume 1587 0.112 2.020 -12.218 14.551
New regional trade agreement membership: FTAijt 1647 0.118 0.322 0.000 1.000
Controls used in probit models (lagged levels)
Dependent and control variables in second stage (changes)
Table 3: Selection into Entering a Regional Trade Agreement
Explanatory variables: Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Probit 7 Probit 8 Probit 9 Probit 10
Total bilateral GDP: ln TGDPij,t-1 -0.279 -0.401 -1.015 -1.029 -1.059 -0.229 -0.357 -1.014 -1.027 -1.053
-5.78 *** -7.34 *** -11.73 *** -11.74 *** -11.62 *** -4.66 *** -6.40 *** -10.79 *** -10.79 *** -10.68 ***
Similarity in bilateral GDP: ln SGDPij,t-1 0.192 - - - - 0.230 - - - -
2.60 *** - - - - 3.04 *** - - - -
Similarity in bilateral unskilled endowment: ln SLij,t-1 - 0.538 0.998 0.790 -0.308 - 0.543 1.031 0.814 -0.190
- 4.55 *** 7.24 *** 4.37 *** -0.32 - 4.49 *** 7.08 *** 4.37 *** -0.19
Similarity in bilateral skilled endowment: ln SHij,t-1 - 0.580 0.951 0.945 5.860 - 0.546 0.677 0.656 4.170
- 1.59 2.14 ** 2.15 ** 1.26 - 1.43 1.45 1.43 0.88
Similarity in bilateral capital endowment: ln SKij,t-1 - -0.520 -1.322 -1.409 -1.444 - -0.487 -1.345 -1.433 -1.462
- -4.47 *** -8.90 *** -9.01 *** -9.08 *** - -4.11 *** -8.50 *** -8.69 *** -8.73 ***
Absolute bilateral difference in skilled-to-unskilled endowment ratios: AHLij,t-1 -0.009 - - - - -0.012 - - - -
-2.28 ** - - - - -3.01 *** - - - -
Absolute bilateral difference in capital-to-unskilled endowment ratios: AKLij,t-1 0.002 - - - - 0.048 - - - -
0.02 - - - - 0.54 - - - -
Bilateral trade costs: TCij,t-1 -3.452 -3.297 -1.394 -1.418 -3.848 -3.458 -3.310 -1.563 -1.594 -3.072
-7.21 *** -6.84 *** -2.22 ** -2.26 ** -1.06 -7.07 *** -6.71 *** -2.46 ** -2.51 ** -0.84
Interaction term: ln SLij,t-1×TCij,t-1 - - - - 1.058 - - - - 0.967
- - - - 1.16 - - - - 1.04
Interaction term: ln SKij,t-1×TCij,t-1 - - - - -4.676 - - - - -3.333
- - - - -1.06 - - - - -0.74
Average bilateral investment costs:0.5*ICi,t-1+0.5*ICj,t-1 0.037 0.040 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.037 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.043
4.66 *** 5.06 *** 4.19 *** 4.09 *** 4.06 *** 4.56 *** 5.06 *** 3.93 *** 3.83 *** 3.81 ***
Absolute difference in bilateral investment costs: abs(ICi,t-1-ICj,t-1) 0.018 0.018 0.039 0.043 0.042 0.017 0.017 0.036 0.040 0.040
2.78 *** 2.78 *** 4.74 *** 5.00 *** 4.97 *** 2.58 *** 2.55 ** 4.36 *** 4.65 *** 4.63 ***
Interaction term: ln SLij,t-1×(ICi,t-1/ICj,t-1) if Lj,t-1>Li,t-1 else ln SLij,t-1×(ICj,t-1/ICi,t-1) - - - 0.178 0.172 - - - 0.186 0.181
- - - 1.63 1.55 - - - 1.65 * 1.59
Exporter duties: Duti,t-1 - - -0.120 -0.122 -0.124 - - -0.126 -0.128 -0.129
- - -6.72 *** -6.79 *** -6.85 *** - - -6.83 *** -6.89 *** -6.94 ***
Importer duties: Dutj,t-1 - - -0.124 -0.126 -0.126 - - -0.130 -0.132 -0.132
- - -6.96 *** -7.02 *** -7.00 *** - - -7.06 *** -7.12 *** -7.12 ***
Year Dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 1647 1647 1297 1297 1297 1647 1647 1297 1297 1297
Log-likelihood -456.52 -445.53 -322.86 -321.49 -320.39 -440.62 -432.95 -313.74 -312.33 -311.60
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.25 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.27 0.40 0.41 0.41
Probit versus logit (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004; distributed as χ2(1)) 5.02 ** 6.46 ** 14.95 *** 15.51 *** 15.36 *** 1.26 2.66 21.91 *** 22.49 *** 22.71 ***
Note: Figures below coefficients are z-statistics. Constant, time trend and year dummies are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 4: Treatment Effect of the Treated from Entering a Regional Trade Agreement on the Intra-Industry Trade Share and Trade Volumes
(Based on Probit 9 of Table 3)
Estimator Corrected GLI Uncorrected GLI Volume of trade (log)
Descriptive comparison (without accounting for self-selection) 0.006 0.008 0.091 ***
     Standard error 0.008 0.007 0.034
Mahalanobis distance metric (bias-adjusted):
One-to-one matching 0.043 *** 0.041 *** 0.172 ***
     Standard error 0.012 0.012 0.038
Five nearest neighbor matching 0.018 * 0.017 * 0.204 ***
      Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.032
Propensity score metric:
One-to-one matching 0.016 * 0.016 * 0.096 **
     Standard error 0.010 0.009 0.045
Five nearest neighbor matching 0.029 *** 0.025 *** 0.093 ***
      Standard error 0.008 0.008 0.036
Radius matching (radius is 0.1) 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.086 ***
     Standard error 0.005 0.005 0.022
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel; bandwidth=0.06) 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 0.086 ***
     Standard error 0.005 0.004 0.021
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis of the Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT) from Entering a Regional Trade Agreement on the Intra-Industry Trade Share
(Dependent is the Trade-Imbalance-Corrected Grubel-Lloyd Index)
Estimator Logit 9 Logit 10 Logita) Logitb)
Mahalanobis distance metric (bias-adjusted):
One-to-one matching 0.043 *** 0.049 *** 0.020 ** 0.029 ***
     Standard error 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.009
Five nearest neighbor matching 0.018 * 0.020 ** 0.020 * 0.029 **
      Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.012
Propensity score metric:
One-to-one matching 0.035 *** 0.020 * 0.026 ** 0.024 **
     Standard error 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.012
Five nearest neighbor matching 0.034 *** 0.023 ** 0.037 *** 0.025 ***
      Standard error 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.009
Radius matching (radius is 0.1) 0.027 *** 0.034 *** 0.030 *** 0.032 ***
     Standard error 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel; bandwidth=0.06) 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 0.033 *** 0.027 ***
     Standard error 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
An alternative - block-matching:
Stratification 0.031 *** 0.028 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 ***
     Standard error 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. - a) Such as Logit 9 but including political variables. - b) Logit model as in a) 
plus GDP-weighted observables of third countries. See Table A3 in the Appendix for details.
Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT) from Entering a Regional Trade Agreement on the Intra-Industry Trade Share
(Specification as in Probit 9 of Table 3; Estimates Based on Propensity Score Metric)
Explanatory variables:
Main effect of new regional trade agreement 0.013 0.024 *** 0.027 *** 0.023 ***
0.011 0.009 0.005 0.005
Interaction terms with:
     Total bilateral GDP: ln TGDPij,t-1 -0.021 -0.016 -0.017 ** -0.017 **
0.016 0.013 0.007 0.007
     Similarity in bilateral unskilled endowment: ln SLij,t-1 -0.065 * -0.080 *** -0.060 *** -0.064 ***
0.034 0.026 0.015 0.015
     Similarity in bilateral skilled endowment: ln SHij,t-1 -0.021 0.077 0.084 ** 0.094 **
0.072 0.061 0.039 0.038
     Similarity in bilateral capital endowment: ln SKij,t-1 0.066 * 0.057 ** 0.043 *** 0.045 ***
0.035 0.028 0.016 0.016
     Bilateral trade costs: TCij,t-1 0.020 -0.119 -0.095 * -0.097 **
0.103 0.085 0.050 0.048
     Average bilateral investment costs:0.5*ICi,t-1+0.5*ICj,t-1 0.000 0.001 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
     Absolute difference in bilateral investment costs: abs(ICi,t-1-ICj,t-1) 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Moments of the marginal effect of a new regional trade agreement
     Mean 0.013 0.023 0.027 0.023
     Median 0.028 0.030 0.035 0.032
     Std. Dev. 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.043
     Minimum -0.138 -0.152 -0.130 -0.143
     Maximum 0.090 0.115 0.106 0.103
One-to-one matching Five-nearest neighbours Radius matching Kernel matching
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 7: Treatment Effect of the Treated from Entering a Regional Trade Agreement on the Intra-Industry Trade Share at the SITC 2-digit and 1-digit Level
(Dependent is the Trade-Imbalance-Corrected Grubel-Lloyd Index; Estimates Based on Propensity Score Metric; One-to-one Matching)
Code SITC-label ATT Std. Code SITC-label ATT Std.
00 Live animals chiefly for food 0.015 0.018 57 Explosives and pyrotechnic products -0.020 0.040
01 Meat and meat preparations -0.013 0.009 58 Artificial resins, plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers -0.027 0.016
02 Dairy products and birds'eggs 0.012 0.029 59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 0.042 0.019 **
03 Fish, crustaceans, mollucs, preparations thereof 0.027 0.014 * 5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 0.009
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 0.017 0.018
05 Vegetables and fruit 0.010 0.007 61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s. and dressed furskisg -0.015 0.024
06 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey 0.029 0.031 62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 0.031 0.021
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, manufactures thereof 0.016 0.022 63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 0.024 0.012 *
08 Feeding stuff for animals, not including unmilled cereals -0.047 0.022 ** 64 Paper, paperboard, articles of paper, paper-pulp/board 0.013 0.011
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations -0.009 0.030 65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, related products 0.032 0.011 ***
0 Food and live animals 0.005 66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. 0.015 0.009
67 Iron and steel 0.051 0.014 ***
11 Beverages -0.009 0.015 68 Non-ferrous metals 0.040 0.020 **
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures -0.017 0.028 69 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s. 0.051 0.013 ***
1 Beverages and tobacco -0.013 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0.027
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw 0.015 0.024 71 Power generating machinery and equipment -0.011 0.027
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit 0.006 0.024 72 Machinery specialized for particular industries 0.036 0.014 **
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 0.051 0.054 73 Metalworking machinery 0.031 0.029
24 Cork and wood 0.004 0.013 74 General industrial machinery & equipment, and parts 0.075 0.016 ***
25 Pulp and waste paper -0.047 0.027 * 75 Office machines & automatic data processing equipement 0.026 0.020
26 Textile fibres (except wool tops) and their wastes 0.031 0.015 ** 76 Telecommunications & sound recording apparatus -0.041 0.028
27 Crude fertilizers and crude materials (excluding coal) 0.039 0.012 *** 77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances n.e.s. 0.105 0.022 ***
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0.051 0.021 ** 78 Road vehicles (including  air-cushion vehicles) 0.017 0.017
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. -0.003 0.018 79 Other transport equipment -0.029 0.032
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0.016 7 Machinery and transport equipment 0.023
32 Coal, coke and briquettes 0.001 0.004 81 Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures 0.108 0.035 ***
33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 0.038 0.025 82 Furniture and parts thereof 0.101 0.028 ***
34 Gas, natural and manufactured 0.000 0.201 83 Travel goods, handbags and similair containers -0.029 0.031
35 Electric current 0.146 0.253 84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories -0.028 0.016 *
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0.046 85 Footwear 0.035 0.030
87 Professional, scientific & controling instruments 0.078 0.016 ***
41 Animal oils and fats -0.016 0.038 88 Photographic apparatus, optical goods, watches 0.019 0.020
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats -0.009 0.019 89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 0.023 0.013 *
43 Animal-vegetable oils-fats, processed, and waxes -0.006 0.014 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.038
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes -0.010
91 Postal packages not classified according to kind -0.015 0.020
51 Organic chemicals 0.014 0.017 93 Special transactions not classified according to kind -0.044 0.040
52 Inorganic chemicals 0.014 0.019 94 Animals, live, zoo animals, dogs, cats etc. -0.052 0.048
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 0.016 0.020 95 Arms, of war and ammunition therefor 0.143 0.053 ***
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 0.000 0.018 96 Coin (other than gold) , not being legal tender -0.002 0.002
55 Essential oils & perfume materials; toilet polishing and cleansing prep. 0.012 0.019 97 Gold, non-monetary -0.008 0.013
56 Fertilizers, manufactured 0.033 0.045 9 Commodities and transactions not elswhere classified 0.004
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Control variables are included in the second step estimations throughout. 1-digit figures are unweighted averages.
Table A1: Selection into Entering a Regional Trade Agreement (Including Political Variables)
Explanatory variables:
Total bilateral GDP: ln TGDPij,t-1 -1.090 -2.333 -1.787 -3.244
-9.29 *** -9.28 *** -8.45 *** -7.69 ***
Similarity in bilateral unskilled endowment: ln SLij,t-1 0.853 1.578 4.682 11.157
5.06 *** 4.66 *** 4.74 *** 5.17 ***
Similarity in bilateral skilled endowment: ln SHij,t-1 0.025 -0.170 -17.197 -23.097
0.04 -0.14 -4.88 *** -3.41 ***
Similarity in bilateral capital endowment: ln SKij,t-1 -1.311 -2.672 -6.584 -15.628
-7.08 *** -6.9 *** -6.33 *** -6.55 ***
Bilateral trade costs: TCij,t-1 -1.317 -2.597 4.578 15.260
-1.75 * -1.85 * 0.33 0.58
Average bilateral investment costs:0.5*ICi,t-1+0.5*ICj,t-1 0.021 0.040 -0.254 -0.663
1.08 1.06 -3.89 *** -4.33 ***
Absolute difference in bilateral investment costs: abs(ICi,t-1-ICj,t-1) 0.048 0.090 -0.102 -0.273
4.21 *** 4.15 *** -2.08 ** -2.56 **
Exporter duties: Duti,t-1 -0.156 -0.323 -0.013 0.111
-7.00 *** -7.38 *** -0.14 0.56
Importer duties: Dutj,t-1 -0.161 -0.333 -0.031 0.069
-7.20 *** -7.57 *** -0.33 0.35
Maximum level of total fractionalisation in legislaturea) -1.330 -3.101 -1.240 -1.761
-1.29 -1.52 -1.01 -0.72
Minimum level of total fractionalisation in legislaturea) 6.019 12.515 6.063 13.926
5.29 *** 5.57 *** 4.46 *** 5.08 ***
Maximum index of checks and balancesa) -0.005 0.027 -0.017 -0.030
-0.09 0.24 -0.25 -0.22
Minimum index of checks and balancesa) 0.418 0.732 0.482 0.826
4.36 *** 3.83 *** 4.33 *** 3.74 ***
Maximum index of polarisationa) -0.105 -0.261 -0.079 -0.372
-1.08 -1.4 -0.72 -1.66 *
Minimum index of polarisationa) -0.351 -0.741 -0.403 -0.838
-3.05 *** -3.29 *** -3.10 *** -3.33 ***
Maximum index of durabilityb) -0.013 -0.027 -0.015 -0.031
-4.25 *** -4.68 *** -4.01 *** -4.22 ***
Minimum index of durabilityb) -0.006 -0.020 -0.001 -0.010
-1.44 -2.32 ** -0.25 -0.95
Maximum years in office of chief executive within country-paira) 0.019 0.005 0.037 0.049
0.78 0.11 1.33 0.92
Minimum years in office of chief executive within country-paira) -0.155 -0.237 -0.263 -0.417
-2.41 ** -1.94 * -3.09 *** -2.55 **
Same systema) -0.043 0.561 -0.632 -0.897
-0.22 1.37 -2.68 *** -1.84 *
At least one of the two governments is mainly right-winga) 0.283 0.785 0.207 0.675
1.19 1.7 * 0.76 1.32
Both of the two governments are mainly right-winga) 0.787 1.603 0.966 1.883
2.93 *** 3.18 *** 3.25 *** 3.28 ***
At least one of the two governments is left-winga) 0.410 1.080 0.356 0.928
1.7 * 2.39 ** 1.33 1.82 *
Both of the two governments are left-winga) 0.891 1.851 0.865 2.065
3.24 *** 3.31 *** 2.73 *** 3.29 ***
Pseudo R2 0.491 0.523 0.583 0.616
Log-likelihood -259.7 -243.3 -212.6 -195.7
Probitc) Logitc)
Economic fundamentals:
Political variables:
Probit Logit
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. - a) Annual data are from The World Bank (Beck, Clarke,
Groffe, Keefer, and Walsh, 2004). - b) Annual data are from the Polity IV Project data-set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). - c) Including
GDP-weighted third-country effects. The parameters of the constant, the time dummies, and the (jointly significant) GDP-weighted
observables are not reported for space reasons.
